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ABSTRACT
Mass-market mobile security threats have increased recently
due to the growth of mobile technologies and the popularity
of mobile devices. Accordingly, techniques have been intro-
duced for identifying, classifying, and defending against mo-
bile threats utilizing static, dynamic, on-device, off-device,
and hybrid approaches. In this paper, we contribute to
the mobile security defense posture by introducing Andro-
profiler, a hybrid behavior based analysis and classification
system for mobile malware. Andro-profiler classifies mal-
ware by exploiting the behavior profiling extracted from
the integrated system logs including system calls, which
are implicitly equivalent to distinct behavior characteristics.
Andro-profiler executes a malicious application on an emu-
lator in order to generate the integrated system logs, and
creates human-readable behavior profiles by analyzing the
integrated system logs. By comparing the behavior profile
of malicious application with representative behavior profile
for each malware family, Andro-profiler detects and classifies
it into malware families. The experiment results demon-
strate that Andro-profiler is scalable, performs well in de-
tecting and classifying malware with accuracy greater than
98%, outperforms the existing state-of-the-art work, and is
capable of identifying zero-day mobile malware samples.
Keywords. Behavior profiling, Similarity, System call, An-
droid, Malware
1. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth in the number of mobile devices
running the Android platform has attracted the attention
of hackers for the wealth of sensitive information that are
usually stored on mobile devices, including phone numbers,
short messages, confidential emails and correspondences, and
banking information and credentials. The availability of
this information in many mass-market mobile devices makes
them a desirable target for hackers, who excelled at develop-
ing a large number of mobile malicious software (malware),
making the security of mobile devices one of the most im-
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portant and challenging areas of research. For example, Ac-
cording to a report by McAfee, the total number of mo-
bile malware continued its linear climb as it broke 8 mil-
lion in the second quarter of 2015, and increased by 17%
over the first quarter of the same year [24]. Moreover, new
malware families and variants were reported to appear ap-
proximately 1 million times in the same quarter. To address
this trend, antivirus (AV) vendors analyze a large number
of malware samples daily in order to prevent them from
spreading widely and to guide users on disinfection and risk
management by classifying malware into broad families.
Mobile as well as traditional malware analysis for detec-
tion and classification falls into two broad types: static and
dynamic analysis. In static analysis, strings of bytes associ-
ated with malware samples are discovered through reverse
engineering and used as a signature for identifying malicious
software. Although fast and efficient, static techniques are
often prone to high false positive rates due to evolution in
code basis and code repacking. Furthermore, additional cost
of those techniques is required for reverse engineering to gen-
erate reliable and meaningful signatures.
On the other hand, dynamic and behavior based analysis
aims to provide methods for effectively and efficiently ex-
tracting unique patterns of each malware family based on
its behavior. Malware samples of the same family often use
the same code base, provide the same functionality using the
same order of behavioral events [26], and so on. In analyz-
ing mobile malware, unique behavior patterns can be rep-
resented by various symbols (e.g., permission set, API call,
and system call) and used to identify malware families. To
this end, researchers previously proposed various detection
and classification methods for malware analysis based on
their behavior, including permission-based, API call-based
and system call-based methods. Permission-based detection
methods are not efficient in classifying benign applications
as benign, since relevant rule sets only focus on detecting
the malware. API call-based detection methods cannot gen-
erate distinct signatures until decompilation or disassembly
process is completed, which is often expensive. System call-
based detection methods can more accurately detect mali-
cious behavior than other methods, since it is impossible to
modify original functionality of system calls: malware cre-
ators always attempt to disguise malicious behavior as nor-
mal behavior. However, proposed methods in this category
mainly deal with frequency of system calls well presented
in malware. The number of invoked system calls is usually
small, and most of the system calls used in malware (e.g.,
read(), write()) are also observed in both benign applica-
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tions, affecting the accuracy of those methods. To this end,
one needs to consider more features, such as arguments in
the system call and network activities, to enhance malware
detection and classification via behavior profiling.
To overcome the drawbacks in previous methods, we pro-
pose a feature-rich anti-malware system based on behavior
profiling called Andro-profiler. Our proposed behavior pro-
filing system comprises mobile devices and a remote server to
facilitate profiling, and adopts profiling method in the mal-
ware analysis domain. We exploit system calls, including
their arguments provided by LKM (Loadable Kernel Mod-
ule) and system logs (e.g., SMS, call, and network I/O) pro-
vided by Droidbox [8] as feature vectors for malware char-
acterization. We define system calls and system logs as in-
tegrated system logs from which we directly infer behavior
patterns representation using the concept of behavior profil-
ing of Bayer [2]. We assume that: a) malware samples have
unique malicious behavior patterns, b) malicious behavior
is determined by system calls, and c) such system call set
has influence on the behavior of the program (malware).
We prepare representative behavior profile for each malware
family represented by integrated system logs including sys-
tem calls, their arguments, and system logs of Droidbox–an
analysis system we utilize in this work. We construct the
behavior profile of each malware sample through its inte-
grated system logs by executing it on an emulator. Then,
by comparing the behavior profiles across samples, we can
detect and classify malware samples into related families.
Contribution: The main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
1. We propose a novel anti-malware system based on be-
havior profiling called Andro-profiler. We classify mal-
ware by exploiting the behavior profiling extracted from
integrated system logs. Our method captures the be-
havior profiling by converting integrated system logs
into human-readable contexts, which helps analysts
analyze malware intuitively.
2. Andro-profiler enables AV vendors to react to many
species of malicious samples by classifying and match-
ing them with those previously detected quickly and
efficiently. Our system can help detect new malware
including existing malware’s variants and zero-day ex-
ploits. This is further highlighted through in-depth
experiments using real-world malware samples.
3. Our proposed method is robust, and can be extended
with additional features that depict the unique behav-
ior patterns of malware. Our method can easily employ
static analysis technique to capture malicious behav-
ior, in combination of the dynamic behavior, which is
shown to outperform existing techniques in the liter-
ature. This feature of our work is highlighted by a
comparison with the prior literature, experimentally.
2. RELATEDWORK
Based on where the scan and monitoring of the mobile
malware takes place, malware analysis methods are classified
into three types: detection methods on the mobile device,
detection methods outside the mobile device, and hybrid
detection methods. We classify the literature based on the
type of the malicious behavior into permission-based and
footprint-based methods. Footprint-based methods include
system call-based, API call-based, decompiled code-based,
and XML information-based methods. The detection meth-
ods on mobile device scan malicious behavior patterns on
the mobile device and return the analysis results to the user.
However, those approaches do not consider the resource con-
straints on the mobile device: low computing power and lim-
ited battery life, affect their usability and user experience.
The detection methods outside mobile device execute detec-
tion algorithms on an emulator or a real device running the
targeted applications, and conduct static or dynamic analy-
sis for determining the nature of those applications. Those
approaches do not need to consider resource constraints, but
cannot respond to new malware families quickly. To over-
come the drawbacks in both approaches, hybrid approaches
have been introduced in mobile malware analysis. Client
modules deployed on mobile devices collect information re-
lated to installed applications on those devices and send the
information to a remote server. The remote server then an-
alyzes log files using their detection algorithms of choice,
while not impeding usability and user experience. Table 1
summarizes the various malware detection or classification
methods in the literature. In the following, we elaborate on
some of the related works in each category.
Table 1: Various malware detection/classification
methods in previous works.
Approach Method Feature Previous works
Detection on
mobile device
Permission Permission
[10]
[27]
Footprint
System resources
[32]
[5]
Taint tracing [9]
Event log, System call [4]
Detection
outside
mobile device
Permission Permission [28]
Footprint
System call, Disassembled code [3]
System call, Interaction log [30]
System/API call, Taint tracing [29]
Permission +
Footprint
Permission, API call [40]
Permission, API call,
XML information
[14]
[38]
[1]
Permission, API call,
System call,
XML information,
Disassembled code
[39]
[43]
[33]
Hybrid Footprint
System call
[6]
[15]
Function call [31]
2.1 Detection Methods on Mobile Devices
Previous work in this category has introduced malware
detection methods that can execute applications on devices,
providing online detection. Enck et al. [10] proposed the
Kirin security service, which performs lightweight certifi-
cation of applications to mitigate malware at installation
time. Kirin examined the requested permissions of applica-
tions, compared them with self-defined security rules, and
determined whether malicious activities were carried out or
not. In order to do that, they relied on permissions given
in a manifest file, Androidmanifest.xml. However, appli-
cation developers tend to excessively declare permissions in
a manifest file, although the application does not actually
need all of the permissions. To that end, those methods
produce low accuracy. Pearce et al. [27] introduced Ad-
Droid, in which they separated advertising permissions for
the Android platform. In AdDroid, the host application and
the core advertising code ran in isolated environment, where
applications using AdDroid did not send sensitive informa-
tion to advertisement server anymore. However, AdDroid
did not consider information leakage unrelated to advertise-
ment, which is the case in the majority of malware.
Shabtai et al. [32] proposed Andromaly, a behavior-based
detection framework for Android-based mobile devices. An-
dromaly is a host-based intrusion detection system that con-
tinuously monitored various resources and classified mali-
cious applications using a machine learning algorithm. These
proposed methods, however, require a significant hardware
capacity (e.g., CPU, RAM, and battery life) in order to
monitor all resources comprehensively. Bugiel et al. [5] pro-
posed Xmandroid, a system-centric and policy-driven run-
time monitoring system that regulates communications be-
tween applications. Based on heuristic analysis, the authors
identified attack patterns and classified malicious applica-
tions.
Enck et al. [9] proposed Taintdroid, an extension to the
Android mobile-phone platform that tracks the flow of sensi-
tive information through third-party applications. If tainted
data left the Android device, Taintdroid provided a report
logging the leaked data, where the data is sent and which
application leaked it. Taintdroid focused on information
leakage, and then an emulator such as Droidbox embedded
Taintdroid and tracked information leakage.
Bose et al. [4] proposed a signature-based detection method
for the Symbian operating system. The method is a two-
stage mapping technique consisting of extraction process
and representation process that constructed these signatures
at run-time from the monitored system events and system
calls. The method used temporal logic to detect malicious
activity over time that matched a set of signatures repre-
sented as a sequence of events. However, the method needed
to obtain root privileges to access the kernel, and required
sufficient hardware capacity to extract system calls and con-
vert related features into signatures.
2.2 DetectionMethods OutsideMobile Devices
Previous work in this category introduced malware detec-
tion methods that execute relevant applications outside the
device, providing offline detection. These methods execute
their detection algorithms on an emulator or a real device
other than the host device. Thus they are not constrained
by constraints of real devices, and do not impede usability
and user experience.
Peng et al. [28] used probabilistic generative models for
risk scoring schemes, ranging from the simple Na¨ıve Bayes
to advanced hierarchical mixture models. Their proposed
methods computed a real risk score of Android applications
based on the requested permissions, and differentiated be-
tween malware and benign applications. However, applica-
tion developers tend to excessively declare permissions in a
manifest file, requiring the method to rely on other criteria
for higher detection and classification accuracy.
Blasing et al. [3] proposed an Android Application Sand-
box (AASandbox), which enables static and dynamic anal-
ysis on the Android platform. In the static analysis phase,
AASandbox decompressed installation files and disassem-
bled intended executable files, then compared them with
pre-defined malicious patterns. In the dynamic analysis
phase, it hijacked system calls for logging and built a fre-
quency table of system calls. However, the dynamic analysis
methods based on the frequency of system calls need a more
elaborate and redefined process in order to improve its de-
tection or classification accuracy. The function name of the
system call as well as arguments used in the system call need
to be considered. Reina et al. [30] introduced CopperDroid,
an approach built on top of QEMU to automatically per-
form dynamic analysis of Android malware. CopperDroid
conducted a unified analysis to characterize low-level OS-
specific and high-level Android-specific behaviors (e.g., in-
formation leakage, sending SMS) by observing and analyzing
system call invocations, IPC and RPC interactions. Rastogi
et al. [29] proposed AppsPlayground, a framework for auto-
matic dynamic analysis, which executes a suspicious appli-
cation on emulator built on top of QEMU. AppsPlayground
determined whether malicious activities were carried out or
not by tracking information leakage and monitoring sensitive
API and system calls.
Yang et al. [40] introduced a systematic approach, called
Money-Guard, to detect stealthy money-stealing applica-
tions in the Android market. Money-Guard checked for
API calls and billing-related permissions to detect stealthy
money-stealing malware, but could not identify various mali-
cious behavioral patterns except for malware sending premium-
rate SMS. Grace et al. [14] proposed an anti-malware sys-
tem, RiskRanker, to determine whether or not an appli-
cation conducts malicious behavior by measuring potential
security risk. RiskRanker classified an application into a
high-risk application if it had exploit code for vulnerabil-
ities in the OS. RiskRanker reported an application as a
medium-risk application that enables to hijack sensitive in-
formation or subscribe premium service without victim’s
consent. Moreover, RiskRanker inspects malware embed-
ding encryption and dynamic loading methods. Wu et al.
[38] proposed DroidMat, which is a feature based malware
detection method. DroidMat chose the requested permis-
sions, Intent message, and API calls as feature vectors, ex-
tracted them from various resources such as manifest file and
bytecode. By leveraging a K-means clustering algorithm,
DroidMat modeled malware samples according to their char-
acteristics, and then determine whether or not an applica-
tion is malicious by leveraging K-NN algorithm. Arp et al.
[1] proposed DREBIN which utilizes the used permissions,
suspicious API calls, and network addresses as feature vec-
tors for identifying applications. DREBIN extracted those
features from the manifest and dex bytecode files, and iden-
tified malware by leveraging Support Vector Machine (SVM)
algorithm.
Yan et al. [39] proposed DroidScope built on top of QEMU
and enabled to reconstruct the OS-level and Java-level se-
mantic views simultaneously. They analyzed malware by
collecting native and Dalvik instruction traces, API-level ac-
tivity, and information leakage. Zhou et al. [43] proposed
DroidRanger, which identifies malicious behavior through
both permission-based behavioral footprint scheme for the
detection of known malware and a heuristic-based filtering
scheme for detection of zero-day malware. Spreitzenbarth et
al. [33] proposed Mobile-Sandbox, static and dynamic an-
alyzer for Android applications, like in AASandbox. In the
static analysis phase, Mobile-Sandbox parsed a manifest file,
decompiled the application, and checked whether suspicious
permissions are used or not. In the dynamic analysis phase,
they executed the application on Droidbox, logged every op-
eration of the application, and recorded native library calls
executed by processes. They extracted native library calls
by exploiting ltrace [23]; ltrace is executed after installation
process is completed.
2.3 Hybrid Methods
In hybrid detection methods, clients collect meta informa-
tion on applications on the device and send that information
to a remote server. The remote server then analyzes this
information using a detection algorithm and makes a deci-
sion on whether an application is benign or malicious. This
approach compensates for the drawbacks of the online and
offline detection methods. However, users have to agree in
advance on what client module will send user information
to the remote server.
Burguera et al. [6] proposed a lightweight client called
Crowdroid which monitored system calls, made a frequency
table using those system calls, and sent them to a central-
ized server. The remote server then identified malicious be-
havior in a statistical manner and detected malware using
a K-means clustering algorithm. Crowdroid extracted sys-
tem calls by exploiting Strace [34], but Strace is executed
after installation—Crowdroid cannot detect malicious be-
havior during the installation process, and depends on the
functionality of Strace. Isohara et al. [15] proposed a kernel-
based behavior analysis system that consisted of a system
call log collector on an Android device and a log analyzer on
a remote server. The client collected system calls generated
at installation time and sent the logs to a remote server.
The remote server then compared patterns in the logs with
16 pre-defined patterns. Since pre-defined behavior patterns
mainly focused on malicious behaviors such as restricted in-
formation leakage, jailbreak, and abuse of root privileges,
their system could not detect malicious behavior such as
sending premium-rate SMS and calling premium-rate code.
They also do not guarantee sufficient scalability.
Schmidt et al. [31] proposed a collaboration mechanism
for Android platform security comprising a log collector on
the device and a remote analyzer. In their proposed system,
the client monitored the behavior of the malicious appli-
cation at the installation time, ran analysis based on the
similarity of the function call set used, exchanged the result
of analysis with neighboring devices, and performed collab-
orative malware detection.
Other methods. Other methods that look at mal-actor
specific information for detection and classification have been
explored as well. For example, Jang et al. [17] proposed
Andro-autopsy, an anti-malware system based on malware
creator information, Andro-dumpsys [18], which utilizes mal-
ware centric information (mainly utilizing memory usage),
and Mal-Netminer [19], which utilizes network theoretic ap-
proach to feature extraction and classification. Kang et al.
introduced Andro-Tracker [20, 21], which utilizes static an-
droid data for classification, and
3. BEHAVIOR PROFILING
In the literature of traditional malware research related to
personal computers operating Microsoft Windows, Bayer et
al. [2] proposed a method for scalable behavior-based mal-
ware clustering. The method contributes to the theoretical
foundations of malware analysis by discussing the behavior-
based profiling formally. Given the relevance of this work
to our work, we review definitions of behavior profiling from
the aforementioned work for the completeness of our pre-
sentation, and incorporate details specific to our proposed
system in the following.
Definition (behavior profiling). A behavior profiling P is
defined by four tuples as P = (O,OP,Γ,∆), where O is the
set of all objects and OP is the set of all operations, which
is represented in nested dictionary form as {name : {target :
attribute}}. Γ ⊆ (O×OP ) is a relation assigning more than
one operation to each other, and ∆ ⊆ ((O×OP ), (O×OP ))
represents the sequence-unrelated set, which is equivalent to
integrated system logs.
Object: An object represents an abstract functionality
that malware samples need for carrying out the malicious
behavior. [35] manually analyzed many malware samples
from various datasets such as contagion and Android Mal-
ware Genome Project. They classified malicious behaviors
into six groups according to behavior patterns: make call,
send SMS, network access, access personal information, alter
filesystem, and execute external application. We also man-
ually inspected malware samples we had, and then defined
malicious behavior as outlined by [35]; since some behavior
patterns are not found in our dataset, we leave them out.
We define malicious behavior as the sending of premium-
rate SMS, the calling of premium-rate number, the sending
of sensitive information, and converting data for transmis-
sion. We do not consider malicious behavior such as privi-
lege escalation and C & C (Command and Control) attack
since dynamic analysis methods hardly detect malware exe-
cuting malicious behavior under given condition (e.g., SDK
version, cellular network connection status, time, or place).
We formally define object as following:
Object ::= Object-type
Object-type ::= Telephony | Phone | Network
Operation: An operation represents a concrete malicious
behavior. Formally, an operation comprises of operation-
name, operation-target, and operation-attribute. Operation-
name is the identifier for malicious behavior. Operation-
target is the attack objective of malware, such as contents of
external storage and system information. Operation-attribute
is a meaningful value that the malware wants to obtain; for
example, the attribute of country code (operation-target) is
Korea, and operation-name is sending sensitive information.
We formally define operation as follows:
Operation ::= { Operation-name : { Operation-target :
Operation-attribute } }
Operation-name ::= Sending SMS | Calling | Sending sensitive
information | Converting data
Operation-target ::= Premium-rate SMS/number | device ID |
IMEI | IMSI | MCC | MNC | ...| etc.
Table 2 shows an example of mapping of network object
and the corresponding operations. In the case of malicious
behavior for sending sensitive information, we represent the
profile of that behavior as follows: “{Network : {Sending
sensitive information : {{IMEI : 357242043237517}, {MCC
: 310}, {MNC : 260}, {Location : GPS Coordinates } · · · , }
} }”.
4. ANDRO-PROFILER: ANANTI-MALWARE
SYSTEM
Table 2: Example of mapping of network object.
Type Name Target Attribute
Network
Sending
sensitive information
Android Id 3531505c0b421c4d
Device type Android
IMEI 357242043237517
IMSI 310005123456789
MCC 310
MNC 260
OS version 10
SDK version 2.3.4
Carrier Android
Country code en
Location GPS Coordinates
Converting data
Cipher algorithm No, DES, AES, Blowfish
Destination URL http://my365image.com
Port 80
Encoding algorithm gzip
In the following we review the design and operation of
Andro-Profiler, a hybrid system for malware analysis and
classification that combines the on-device capabilities for
profiling and off-device capabilities for analysis and classifi-
cation.
Behavior  
Profiling Module 
Similarity  
Matching Module 
Behavior 
Characterization Module 
Behavior  
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Repository 
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Estimated group 
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App file to analyze 
Crawled App file 
Figure 1: Overall procedure of Andro-profiler.
4.1 Overview
As illustrated in Figure 1, we propose a hybrid anti-malware
system that consists of a client application on the mobile de-
vice and a profiling and analysis remote server. The client
application on the mobile device collects installed applica-
tion information, and sends that information to the remote
server; the client application only sends application-specific
information such as the hash digest of apk file and package
name. If the remote server cannot crawl that application,
the client application sends the application package file (apk)
to the remote server. The remote server analyzes the mali-
cious application and decides whether it is malicious or not
based on its behavior. The remote server consists of three
components: crawler, repository, and analyzer. The crawler
component crawls applications from repositories, such as of-
ficial markets and alternative markets. The crawled appli-
cations are then passed to the repository component which
runs a duplication test by comparing the hash digest of the
apk file to each other. If the crawled application is a du-
plicate, it is discarded; otherwise, the repository component
sends that application to the analyzer component. After
completing the analysis, the analyzer component sends the
analysis results to both the repository component and the
client application. Upon receiving the analysis results from
the remote server, the client application displays the re-
sult on the screen to the user. The repository component
searches its database upon the repository component receiv-
ing an analysis request from the client. If the repository
component does not have analysis results to fulfill the client
application’s request, it fetches the crawler component. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the analyzer component has two pro-
cesses: an extraction process of integrated system logs and
a decision process. The extraction process of integrated sys-
tem logs is composed of a behavior identification module,
and the decision process is composed of three modules: a
behavior profiling module, a behavior categorization mod-
ule, and a similarity matching module. In the following, we
review the extraction and decision processes.
Decision Process Extraction process of  
integrated system logs 
User 
application 
Dalvik 
(Virtual Machine) 
Kernel 
Hardware 
Integrated 
system 
logger 
System calls, 
arguments 
Data leak, 
SMS/Call  
Droidbox 
LKM 
(Loadable kernel 
module) 
Behavior Identification Module 
Figure 2: Overview of the analyzer component.
4.2 Extraction Process of Integrated System
Logs
Behavior Identification module: Andro-profiler conducts
malware characterization based on dynamic behavior anal-
ysis. Our system extended Droidbox to embed the LKM
(Loadable Kernel Module) for hijacking system calls includ-
ing their arguments. More specifically, the Behavior Identi-
fication (BI) module in our system executes malware on an
emulator and monitors malicious behavior in an isolated en-
vironment. Whenever malware is executed on the emulator,
the BI fetches the integrated system logger. The integrated
system logger parses system calls including their arguments
provided by LKM and system logs provided by Droidbox;
Droidbox monitors SMS, call, and network I/O. The parsed
integrated system logs are then passed to the decision pro-
cess.
4.3 Decision Process
As shown in Figure 2, the decision process consists of three
modules: behavior profiling, behavior categorization, and
similarity matching module. In the following we elaborate
on each of those modules.
4.3.1 Behavior Profiling Module
The Behavior Profiling (BP) module parses the integrated
system logs of a given application and makes the behav-
ior profile. The BP module is implemented as described
in previous section (Behavior Profiling). For example, the
BP module makes a behavior profile of GinMaster which
steals sensitive information, as illustrated in Figure 3. Ac-
cording to the analysis report of F-Secure [11], GinMaster
steals sensitive information, such as International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI), International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), User Identifier (UID), Subscriber Identifica-
tion Module (SIM) number, telephone number, and network
type, to a remote server. The behavior profile made by the
BP module is similar to the analysis report of F-Secure, and
it is simple and relatively easy to understand.
4.3.2 Behavior Categorization Module
The behavior categorization (BC) module categorizes a
given application according to its behavior patterns. As
we mentioned earlier, we define malicious behavior as the
sending of premium-rate SMS, the calling of premium-rate
number, the sending of sensitive information, and convert-
ing data for transmission. Since the numbers of malicious
behavior patterns which we define are four, the possible
permutation sets of malicious behavior patterns are 15 (=∑4
i=1 4Ci). If an application does not behave in accordance
with a pre-defined malicious behavior, our system decides
that the application is benign.
4.3.3 Similarity Matching Module
The different similarity metrics need to be applied to be-
havior factors since they have different types of argument.
Instead of using machine learning approaches that usually
use the same similarity metric for features, we design the
appropriate similarity metrics for behavior factors. The sim-
ilarity matching (SM) module computes the similarity score
between the behavior profile of malicious application and
representative behavior profile of each malware family. The
SM then classifies the malicious application into the group
with which it bears the most similarity based on its behav-
ior. The representative behavior profile of each malware
family has to depict the unique and common behavior pat-
terns of each malware family, then SM module chooses one
of the methods updating the representative behavior profile
as follows:
1. Method 1: The first update method is intersection.
The representative behavior profile for each malware
family is updated by the intersection of behavior pro-
files of members in each subgroup. In this update
method, and as the number of members of each mal-
ware family increases, the representative behavior pro-
files decrease.
2. Method 2: The second update method is union. The
representative behavior profile for each malware family
is updated by the union of behavior profiles of mem-
bers in each subgroup. In this update method, as the
number of members of each malware family increases,
the representative behavior profiles increase.
We define the similarity score as the intensity with which
resources are accessed. Access to resources includes hard-
ware resources (e.g., Call, SMS, Bluetooth, and Camera),
system information, and private information (as detailed
earlier); we define the similarity score as the weighted sum of
the similarity of four behavior factors. The similarity score
between the behavior profile of malicious application and a
representative behavior profile for each malware family is
given by:
S =
∑
i
wi ·BFSi where
∑
i
wi = 1 (1)
where BFSi and wi are the similarity and weight of be-
havior factor i, respectively. Similarity of behavior fac-
tor (BFS) is composed of four parts: similarity of send-
ing premium-rate SMS (SS), calling premium-rate number
(CS), sending sensitive information (SIS), and converting
data (CDS). We choose the weight (wi) to be 0.33 for SS,
0.33 for CS, 0.21 for SIS, and 0.13 for CDS—we determined
that such settings for weight values are optimal and provide
best performance through experiments.
Table 3 shows similarity metric to apply to each behavior
factor, and we compute the similarity score for each behavior
factor as follows:
1. We compute the similarity score for sending premium–
rate SMS and calling premium–rate number, as com-
paring whether a relevant hardware resource is ac-
cessed or not. String similarity (e.g., phone number,
code number) is less meaningful as a feature except
for perfect matching since a difference of one bit yields
the same result as with the difference of all bits in this
case. Therefore, we give a similarity score of one if they
have the same behavior; otherwise, we give a score of
zero. Hence, the value of similarity score for both SS
and CS is binary.
2. We compute the similarity score for sending sensitive
information by applying the Jaccard index. We de-
fine the sensitive information as follows (highlighted
in Table 2 by an example):
(a) System information: IMEI, IMSI, device ID, MCC,
MNC, carrier name, device type, device model,
OS version.
(b) Private information: external storage contents,
location, country code, language.
We compute the similarity score for converting data
(CDS), as the average of the similarity for a destina-
tion URL, cipher algorithm, and encoding algorithm.
In the case of similarity of a destination URL, we
first adopt the longest prefix matching. If a partial
matching occurs, we adopt the Levenshtein distance
to the residual string except the substring to which
the longest prefix matching is used. For example, let
A.B.C.D and A.B.E.F be two URLs. In this case, we
adopt Levenshtein distance to the residual URLs: C.D
and E.F. As for the cipher algorithm and encoding al-
gorithm, we give a similarity score of one if they have
used the same algorithm; otherwise, we give a score of
zero. The value of similarity score for both SIS and
CDS was [0, 1].
3. If a given application does not act maliciously (based
on the defined criteria above) except for CDS, we con-
sider that application to be benign.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following we demonstrate the performance and ac-
curacy of Andro-profiler by highlighting aspects of imple-
mentation and testing it on various real-world mobile mal-
ware samples and families.
Hash digest(SHA256) 
Object 
Operation 
Figure 3: Implementation of behavior profiling (e.g., GinMaster).
Table 3: Similarity metric to apply to each behavior factor.
Behavior factor Behavior target Similarity metric
Sending SMS Premium–rate Binary (0 or 1)
Calling Premium–rate Binary (0 or 1)
Sending sensitive information
System information,
Private information
Jaccard index [0, 1]
Converting data
Destination URL
Modified levenshtein
distance [0, 1]
Cipher algorithm
(DES, AES, Blowfish)
Binary (0 or 1)
Encoding algorithm (Gzip or not) Binary (0 or 1)
5.1 Implementation
Our anti-malware system is composed of a mobile device
and a remote server; the client application is installed on
the mobile device (SKY IM-A690S) running on the An-
droid 2.3.3, and three components—a crawler, repository,
and analyzer—were installed on the remote server. The re-
mote server has an Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5660 processor and
4GB of RAM with 32-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS operating sys-
tem; we performed all experiments in a hypervisor-based
virtualization environment—VMWare ESXi; http://www.
vmware.com/.
We implemented each component of our anti-malware sys-
tem with Python high level programming language (as scripts)
as follows:
1. The client component on the mobile device is imple-
mented in the form of an application and communi-
cated with the remote server. The crawler component
sent the package name to GooglePlay and downloaded
target application. The repository component stored
the behavior profile of each application in a database.
2. The analyzer component is composed of the BI, BP,
BC, and SM modules. In the following we provide
details on each of those modules.
(a) The BI module is implemented as python script
coupled with Droidbox. The emulator is run on
the Android 2.3.4 (level 10). In order to capture
the malicious behavior, the BI module executed
each application for 60 seconds after the installa-
tion process is completed. After capturing inte-
grated system logs of malicious application, the
BI module passed those logs to the BP module
and restored the emulator to the initial state only
for capturing malicious behavior.
(b) The BP module parsed integrated system logs to
make the behavior profile of each malware, and
stored the behavior profile as a dictionary struc-
ture of the Python language for efficient member-
ship test. The parsing rule listed in Table 4 con-
sists of system call and its arguments—only ar-
guments provided by LKM, and information pro-
vided by Droidbox. The parsed behavior pro-
file is encoded in a base-64 format and stored in
database.
(c) The BC module categorized malicious application
according to the behavioral patterns, and the SM
module computed similarity score between behav-
ior profile of malicious application and represen-
tative behavior profile for each family. The SM
module classified a malicious application into the
group with highest similarity score, which is at
least 0.85. Whenever a new malware sample is
queued into our anti-malware system for inspec-
tion, the SM module had continuously updated
representative behavior profile according to the
pre-chosen update method.
5.2 Experiment Setup
For performance evaluation, 643 malware samples con-
sisting of 5 malware families were collected from January
2013 to August 2013 through malware repositories such as
virusshare [36], contagio [7], and 8,840 benign samples were
collected through GooglePlay for the same periods. In the
real world, malware comprises a small fraction of all android
apps, so it makes sense to use a larger set of benign samples
to mimic the realistic scenario. Duplicated malware samples
were eliminated according to SHA 256, and duplicated be-
nign samples were eliminated according to the application
package name and SHA 256. We also excluded malware
samples diagnosed by fewer than 9 AV vendors included by
the VirusTotal dataset [37]. We used textual description
of malware produced by F-Secure [12]. The details of the
dataset we used are in Table 5.
For the validation of our work, we used 5-fold cross-validation
to evaluate the performance in our experiments. The k-fold
cross-validation is a widely used technique in machine learn-
ing. In a nutshell, the method partitions the dataset into k
equal size subsets, where each subset is used only once for
testing and validation of the training model, and the k − 1
remaining subsets are used for training the model. This is,
a model is built using k−1 subsets, and tested using the re-
maining subset. Then, the subset used in the previous step
for testing is used for training, and a subset in the k − 1
sets previously not used for testing is used for testing. The
process is repeated k times by alternating the testing set,
and the results are averaged over the runs.
5.3 Comparing Different Methods
To the best of our knowledge, the closest approach in
the literature to Andro-profiler is Crowdroid [6]. Crow-
droid monitors invoked system calls and makes frequency
table of system calls at the client side. Crowdroid iden-
tifies malicious behavior and detects malware utilizing the
K-means algorithm at the server side. For the complete-
ness of our work, we provide an experimental comparison
between Andro-profiler and Crowdroid. To conduct more
fair performance evaluation and comparison, we make both
systems work in a similar context and using similar settings:
we modify Crowdroid to hook all system calls invoked during
the execution processes, including the installation phase.
5.4 Selection of Weight for Behavior Factors
Andro-profiler needs to select appropriate weights (wi) in
order to guarantee the best performance. However, we can-
not obtain a unique solution of equation (1) analytically,
because there are only two equations given in order to com-
pute values of four variables, which means that we cannot
obtain an optimal solution of equation (1). We might ob-
tain local optimum values of equation (1) through simple
numerical approach (iterative method) as follows. First, we
setup initial values of weight by solving arithmetic mean
of them. We apply those values to the equation (1), then
evaluate the classification capability. Next, we increase the
weight of SS and CS, and decrease the weight of SIS and
CDS. We then apply those values to the equation (1), and
conduct the evaluation of classification capability iteratively.
The reason we determine that the weight of CDS is smaller
than other factors is as follows. First, if a client cannot con-
nect to the remote server, a malware sample does not need
to convert format of data for transmitting sensitive infor-
mation. Second, benign applications also need an encoding
algorithm for efficient transmission and cipher algorithm for
secure communication. We adjust the weight of SIS in order
to maximize the effect of calling and sending premium-rate
SMS.
We proceed with the iterative steps until the tendency
of classification accuracy is changed. We believe that our
system reaches a local optimum at that point. Table 6 shows
that the results of simple numerical approach according to
weight change. We choose the value of the weight (wi) to
be 0.33 for SS, 0.33 for CS, 0.21 for SIS, and 0.13 for CDS,
since it provides a good performance that matches close to
the ground truth.
Table 6: The classification accuracy and the num-
ber of cluster according to changes of weight (e.g.,
Method 1). The number of clusters means that the
number of groups that malware/benign samples are
classified into. Bold text means that the tendency
of classification accuracy is changed. At this point,
we believe, our system reaches a local optimum for
the best performance.
No
Weight of behavior factorNumber of clusters
Accuracy
SS CS SIS CDS Malware Benign
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 8 4 0.98
2 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.22 6 2 0.98
3 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.19 6 2 0.98
4 0.31 0.31 0.22 0.16 6 2 0.98
5 0.330.330.21 0.13 6 1 0.98
6 0.350.350.20 0.10 6 1 0.98
5.5 Experiment Results and Analysis
Our performance evaluation focuses on the effectiveness of
malware classification, discriminatory ability between mal-
ware and benign applications, and the efficiency of malware
classification. We demonstrate that our system performs
well in detecting and classifying malware families. We used
the accuracy as the performance metric, since the metric for
performance evaluation must focus on the predictive capa-
bility of the model. We measured the accuracy as the total
number of the hits of the classifier divided by the number of
instances in the whole dataset. The performance of malware
classification model is determined by how well the model
detects and classifies various pieces of malware. We mea-
sured the accuracy as the total number of the hits of the
classifier divided by the number of instances in the whole
dataset. Moreover we used the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) curve as the method for comparing classifica-
Table 4: Example of parsing rules for detecting malicious behavior.
Behavior factor Parsing rule Comment
Sending SMS mms.transaction.SmsReceiverService SMS
Calling
access(/system/app/Phone.apk ∼ )
writev(3, OutgoingCallBroadcaster ∼ ) Calling
Sending sensitive
information
open(/proc/cpuinfo ∼ ), write(1, Processor ∼ ) CPU Spec.
open(/sdcard ∼ ), stat64(/sdcard/ ∼ ) Storage access
stat64(/system/app/MediaProvider.apk),
access(/data/∼/com.android.providers.media/databases),
com.android.providers.media.MediaScannerService),
open(/data/dalvik-cache/system@app
@MediaProvider.apk@classes.dex)
Media file
{stat64 | open | access}(/system/app/Contacts.apk),
{stat64 | open} (/data/∼ @Contacts.apk@classes.dex) Contact information
〈map〉 ∼ { NET OP | mcc | mnc } ∼ 〈\map〉,
〈map〉 ∼ { networkOperator | sim operator } ∼ 〈\map〉 MCC, MNC
〈map〉 ∼ { affid | did | device id | andide } ∼ 〈\map〉 Device ID
〈map〉 ∼ { osversion | device type } ∼ 〈\map〉 OS version
〈map〉 ∼ { manufacturer | phoneModel |
device name | model } ∼ 〈\map〉 Device
〈map〉 ∼ { network | wifi } ∼ 〈\map〉 Wifi information
〈map〉 ∼ { carrier | device carrier } ∼ 〈\map〉 Carrier
〈map〉 ∼ { imei | imsi } ∼ 〈\map〉 IMEI, IMSI
〈map〉 ∼ { longitude | latitude } ∼ 〈\map〉 Location
〈map〉 ∼ { location | country code | locale } ∼ 〈\map〉 Country code
〈map〉 ∼ { language } ∼ 〈\map〉 Language
Converting data
{sendto | OpenNet | SendNet | DataLeak}
( ∼ Content-Encoding: gzip ∼ ) Encoding algorithm
{sendto | OpenNet | SendNet | DataLeak}
( ∼ CryptoUsage: {DES|AES|Blowfish} ∼ ) Cipher algorithm
tion models. To compare the ROC performance of classifiers
intuitively, we calculated the AUC (area under the curve;
also known as the integral) of each classifier, since the AUC
represents the ROC performance in a single scalar value [13].
5.5.1 Effectiveness of Malware Classification
First, we demonstrate that our proposed method provides
effective metric to detect and classify malware families. Ta-
ble 7 presents the result of similarity comparison with the
representative profile of each malware family and benign
applications. Despite that Boxer sends premium-rate SMS
according to anti-virus (AV) analysis report, our emulator-
based approach fails to capture sending premium-rate SMS
due to connection error; our method only captures sending
sensitive information. However, our system performs well
in classify all malware including Boxer. Since the differ-
ence of similarity score among all malware is smaller than
the threshold (0.85), that can be good metric for detect
and classify malware. The difference of similarity score for
AirPush is much larger than the others, because AirPush
sends premium-rate SMS and sends sensitive information
while the other malware families send sensitive information.
Since benign applications do not act maliciously, it is natu-
ral that the difference of similarity score between malware
and benign applications is large based on the metrics and
features utilized for computing the behavior profile.
Next, Table 8 shows that Andro-profiler performs well in
Table 7: The similarity comparison with represen-
tative behavior profile of each malware family and
benign.
Similarity AdWo AirPush Boxer FakeBattScar GinMaster
AdWo - 0.37 0.70 0.70 0.70
AirPush 0.37 - 0.46 0.46 0.50
Boxer 0.70 0.46 - 0.79 0.79
FakeBattScar 0.70 0.46 0.79 - 0.79
GinMaster 0.70 0.50 0.79 0.79 -
Benign 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
classifying malware families with 100% classification accu-
racy on average, regardless of the update method. Fur-
thermore, Andro-profiler is shown to outperform Crowdroid,
which gives an average classification accuracy of 49%. Some
factors may have affected that Crowdroid underperforms the
Andro-profiler. Since invoked system calls among malware
families are similar to each other, Crowdroid limits to clas-
sify malware families; malware families mainly call out sys-
tem calls (e.g., read(), close(), open(), write(), recvmsg()).
Since FakeBattScar calls out more system calls (e.g., open(),
close()) than others and Adwo calls out system call of read()
constantly, two malware families can be classified well. Fur-
thermore, Andro-profiler gives 47% performance improve-
ment advantage over Crowdroid in terms of the AUC. In the
case of method 1, our system clusters Airpush samples into
two groups. We conducted a deep analysis to understand
Table 5: Malware samples and benign samples for experiments.
Category Family Quantity Behavioral characteristics
Malware (643)
AdWo 401 Collect the sensitive information
AirPush 60 Send SMS & collect the sensitive information
FakeBattScar 44 Collect the sensitive information
Boxer 42 Send SMS & collect the sensitive information
GinMaster 96 Collect the sensitive information
Benign (8,840)
Application 7,164 Normal application
Game 1,676 Normal game application
the reason method 1 of our system clustered such samples
into two groups, and found that almost half of Airpush sam-
ples sent premium-rate SMS and collected sensitive informa-
tion (e.g., IMEI, Android version, location information, and
carrier), whereas the other half only collected sensitive in-
formation. To this end, we found that our system identified
malicious behavior and classified malware according to be-
havior patterns of malware families.
Table 8: Classification performance for 643 malware.
Bold text means that Andro-profiler outperforms
Crowdroid in classifying malware families.
Category
Accuracy AUC
Method 1Method 2CrowdroidMethod 1Method 2Crowdroid
Malware
AdWo 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.73
AirPush 1.00 1.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.51
Boxer 1.00 1.00 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.63
FakeBattScar 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
GinMaster 1.00 1.00 0.22 1.00 1.00 0.54
Average 1.00 1.00 0.49 1.00 1.00 0.68
5.5.2 Discriminatory Ability Between Malware and
Benign
When designing an anti-malware system, one important
factor which we should also consider is its discriminatory
ability between malware and benign applications. Anti-
malware systems must detect malware with small errors in
terms of false positive and false negative. We believe that it
is more important for an anti-malware system to detect mal-
ware with small false negative than false positive. However,
for commercial reasons, one may think the opposite: users
can be bothered if their benign applications are misclassi-
fied as malware. Since our method classified five malware
families and benign applications, and for avoiding the am-
biguity of interpretation, we do not adopt false positive rate
and false negative rate as a performance metric. Instead,
we used the accuracy and AUC as the performance metric.
Table 9 shows that Andro-profiler performs well in detect-
ing and classifying malware families with 98% classification
accuracy on average, regardless of the update method, while
Crowdroid detects malware families with 90% classification
accuracy on average. Some factors may have affected that
Crowdroid underperforms the Andro-profiler. Since invoked
system calls between malware and benign samples are sim-
ilar to each other, Crowdroid limits to detect and classify
malware families; all samples mainly call out system calls
(e.g., read(), close(), open(), write(), recvmsg()). Among
these, FakeBattScar calls out more system calls (e.g., open(),
close()) than others and other malware families have similar
call frequencies to benign samples, then malware families
except for FakeBattScar cannot be detected and classified
well. Our proposed methods also outperform Crowdroid by
improving its AUC by about 90%.
Table 9: Classification performance for 643 malware
and 8,840 benign samples. Bold text means that
Andro-profiler outperforms Crowdroid in detecting
malware and classifying malware families.
Category
Accuracy AUC
Method 1Method 2CrowdroidMethod 1Method 2Crowdroid
Malware
AdWo 1.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.49
AirPush 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
Boxer 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
FakeBattScar 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
GinMaster 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49
Benign 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.52
Average 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.52
Andro-profiler misclassified 225 benign samples as mal-
ware. We conducted a deep analysis to understand the high
false positives with Andro-profiler. Interestingly, we found
that some benign samples collected user’s sensitive infor-
mation, which we defined as a trigger for classifying mali-
cious applications (e.g., IMEI, device ID, UUID, latitude,
and longitude). To understand whether other anti-malware
systems and scanners considered those benign applications
as malware or not, we uploaded those suspected Google-
Play samples to VirusTotal and checked scanning results of
various anti-virus vendors. As a result, we found that 110
out of the suspicious benign samples (accounting for about
49%) were diagnosed as malware. The high rate of misclas-
sification of benign applications is, however, understandable
given various potential reasons for such infiltration of gray
area applications into the market place [22].
5.5.3 Effectiveness of Detecting Zero-Day Malware
We demonstrate the effectiveness of detecting zero-day
malware detection. We define an application as a zero-day
malware if it has malicious behavior and it cannot be de-
tected by AV vendors. In order to verify that we had ap-
propriately detected zero-day malware, we made 91 variant
samples consisting of Adwo and AirPush families by leverag-
ing ADAM [41]. All samples used as the base application for
the variants are among the ones which are used in the pre-
vious experiments, and detected by VirusTotal as malware
samples. After creating the variants, we uploaded them (as
samples) to the VirusTotal, and checked scanning results of
various anti-virus (AV) vendors such as F-Secure, Kasper-
sky, ClamAV, and Avast. We noted that none of the sub-
mitted samples is reported as a malware when we carried
out our experiment. As a result of our experiment using
Andro-profiler, we found that it performed well in detecting
all of the variant malware samples with 100% classification
accuracy on average, regardless of the update method.
5.5.4 Efficiency of Malware Classification
Our proposed system only takes 55 seconds/MB for classi-
fying each malware; we exclude setup time for analysis such
as booting time of emulator. The majority of this time is
spent in making the behavior profile; it takes only 0.2 sec-
onds on average to classify malware into each family.
While the performance of our system is operationally rea-
sonable, our system is scalable both horizontally and verti-
cally by design. Horizontally, and given that our server side
components are run in a virtual environment, one can fork
multiple servers by utilizing multiple virtual machines that
exploit the multi-core nature of today’s commodity comput-
ers. Vertically, our system can benefit from being developed
in a lower level language, such as the C language, which
would make the classification process run faster.
6. LIMITATIONS
Andro-profiler has a few limitations for detecting and clas-
sifying malware, since our proposed method uses integrated
system logs as a feature vector and employs dynamic anal-
ysis techniques to capture malware’s behavior. First, it is
difficult for our system to analyze malware that are exe-
cuted only under given conditions (e.g., SDK version, cel-
lular network connection status, time, or place). However,
this shortcoming is addressable by having various platforms
tailored with various settings, as used for traditional mal-
ware in [25]. It is also impossible for our system to analyze
malware embedding anti-malware analysis techniques. Sec-
ond, our emulator-based anti-malware system is dependent
on SDK version of emulator, so our approach has limitation
on analyzing malicious behavior related to privilege escala-
tion. However, those are common drawbacks of dynamic
analysis method or emulator-based detection method and
addressed in the literature at some expense.
Finally, our approach analyzes malware on an emulator
without interaction between human and device: autonomous
installation and execution. When a malware behave upon
an update or by utilizing a drive-by download attack [42],
our approach is limited in reacting to such malware. How-
ever, autonomous installation and execution is an inevitable
procedure for automation of dynamic analysis. Depending
on the number of malware samples to be analyzed, one can
adopt manual human interactions to analyze malware sam-
ples and vet the outcomes of the automatic classification
procedure, as used in [25].
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have presented Andro-profiler, an anti-
malware system based on behavior profiling. Using Andro-
profiler, we classified malware by exploiting the behavior
profiling extracted from integrated system logs, which are
implicitly equivalent to distinct behavior characteristics. Our
behavior profiling is simple and relatively easy to under-
stand, whereas Andro-profiler is capable of distinguishing
benign and malicious applications, and malicious applica-
tions into families. Furthermore, Andro-profiler is capable
of detecting zero-day threats, which are missed by antivirus
scanners.
Our experiments demonstrate that Andro-profiler performs
well in detecting and classifying malware families with over
98% classification accuracy on average regardless of update
method while Crowdroid, a closely related work from the
literature, performs under 90% classification accuracy on
average. Our experiment results indicate that it takes 55
seconds/MB to analyze a malware on average, with a lot
of opportunities for improvements on scalability. Our sys-
tem hence enables AV vendors to react to many species of
malicious samples by classifying and matching these with
previous ones effectively and efficiently.
There are several directions that we will pursue in the
future. First, we would like to augment our system to not
only rely on dynamic and behavioral features, but also static
features that are easy to obtain from the applications at
scale. Furthermore, we will explore scalability issues associ-
ated with our system by implementing some of the guidelines
noted in subsection Efficiency of Malware Classification.
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